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Exploiting the exogenous variation in user fees caused by a Swedish childcare reform, we are 
able to identify the causal effect of childcare costs on fertility in a context in which childcare 
enrollment is almost universal, user fees are low, and labor force participation of mothers is 
very high. Anticipation of a reduction in childcare costs increased the number of first and 
higher order births, but only seemed to affect the timing of second births. For families with 
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1  Introduction 
Low  fertility  rates,  aging  populations,  and  the  concern  for  long-term  labor  supply  have 
inspired  policy  interest  in  how  the  availability  and  price  of  childcare  services  influence 
maternal labor supply and birth rates. Cross-country comparisons show that birth rates are 
indeed higher in OECD countries with high female labor force participation and wide access 
to childcare (D'Addio and Mira d'Ercole, 2005). However, the direction of causality is not 
well understood.  
In this paper we aim to establish if, and how, childcare costs affect fertility. To this end, 
we use the quasi-experiment initiated by a Swedish childcare reform that standardized the fee 
schedules  across  Swedish  municipalities  and  imposed  a  cap  on  childcare  charges. 
Consequently,  households  with  similar  characteristics  experienced  different  cost  changes 
depending on where they lived, and households in a given municipality experienced different 
cost changes depending on characteristics such as household income and the number and age 
of  the  children.  Hence,  conditional  on  household  characteristics,  the  reform  introduced 
exogenous variation in childcare costs.  
Theoretical models of fertility and maternal labor supply (e.g., Ermisch, 1989a, b; Apps 
and Rees, 2004) predict that reductions in childcare costs may affect both fertility and the 
labor supply of mothers. By increasing mothers‘ take-home wages,  lower childcare costs 
make it more attractive to enter the labor market or to work longer hours. However, for 
working  mothers,  lower  childcare  costs  imply  a  direct  reduction  in  the  cost  of  having 
children,  which  in  turn  should  increase  the  demand  for  children.  Hence,  the  effects  of 
childcare costs on fertility are likely to depend on women‘s labor supply decisions. A recent 
study by Lundin et al. (2008) of the same reform that we investigate, using similar estimation 
techniques, finds no effects on maternal labor supply, suggesting that fertility may be the 
margin of adjustment.
1 
Previous micro studies have found mixed support for the hypothesis that lower childcare 
charges increase fertility. Using American survey data, Blau and Robins (1989) conclude that 
higher childcare costs decrease the birth rates of unemployed women but ha ve no effect on 
                                                 
1 Note that even though maternal labor force participation is high in Sweden, many mothers with small children work part-
time, so that there was the potential for an increased labor supply.     3 
employed women. In a study of Italian data, Del Boca (2002) finds that both fertility and 
labor  force  participation  are  positively  correlated  with  better  access  to  childcare.  These 
studies, however, suffer from endogeneity problems. Both the availability of childcare and the 
charges actually paid by families vary according to local governments‘ responses to demand 
or to families‘ individual choices about the quality and quantity of care.  
In a more recent study, Schlosser (2006) examines the introduction of free public pre-
school for children aged 3 and 4 in Israel to estimate the effects of a reduction in childcare 
costs on Arab mothers' labor supply and fertility. She finds no effect on fertility but a positive 
effect on labor supply. Schlosser uses quasi-experimental data and is therefore more likely to 
capture causal effects rather than correlations. Given the context studied by Schlosser; a case 
where fertility was initially high, while maternal labor supply was very low, the results are 
perhaps not so surprising.  
Two recent studies on US data examine the effects on labor supply and fertility using 
changes  in  household  service sector  wages  caused by low-wage immigration. Cortes and 
Tessada (2009) find positive effects on the female labor supply, and especially on highly 
educated mothers who worked longer hours. Furtado and Hock (2010) show that lower wages 
in the childcare sector resulted in higher fertility for highly educated women.
2 
The US context is in many ways similar to that studied here: most Swedish women work, 
have children and use childcare. However, important differences exist, in particular regarding 
which groups were affected by the studied price changes. While low -skill immigration 
primarily lowered the price of flexible nann y services, making it easier for high -earning 
women to combine career and family, the present study examines changes in the already low 
cost of publicly subsidized childcare during regular work hours. Another important difference 
is that the type of childc are studied in this paper is used by the vast majority of Swedish 
families. In 2004, the attendance rate for children aged 3 –6  was  90  percent.  Hence,  as 
opposed to the American price reduction studied by Cortes and Tessada and Furtado and 
Hock, the Swedish price reduction is not targeted to any specific group of parents and was 
enjoyed  by  practically  all  Swedish  families.  However,  given  that  publicly  subsidized 
childcare is only available during regular working hours, there was limited possibility for 
families to demand more hours for childcare other than by enrolling more children. 
                                                 
2 In a related field, a number of studies investigate the impact of other financial incentives, such as child allowances and tax 
incentives, on fertility decisions (see e.g., Cohen et al, 2009, Kearney, 2004, Laroque and Salanié, 2004 and Milligan, 2005).     4 
An important advantage of the present study is that we can estimate the effect of cost 
changes on wide range of households drawn from different parts of the income distribution as 
opposed  to  reviewing  only  on  a  small  segment  of  the  population,  which  is  a  common 
weakness of studies using quasi-experiments. This strengthens the external validity of our 
results  (see  discussion  in  Moffitt,  2005;  and  Angrist  et  al,  2010),  in  particular  regarding 
families with at least one previous child where the analysis covers the vast majority. The 
analysis of first births is however, restricted to married couples which limits our ability to 
generalize the conclusions. 
We find limited effects of the price changes on the fertility behavior of Swedish families. 
The  reduction  in  childcare  costs  which  in  total  corresponded  to  a  quarter  of  one-year 
household earnings for childless couples, had a positive effect on first births which increased 
by  9.5  percent.  This  corresponds  to  an  increase  of  5.5  percent  for  a  10,000  US  dollar 
reduction  in  the  present  value  of  the  future  marginal  child  care  costs.  For  families  with 
children, on the other hand, we only find statistically weak evidence on the timing for higher 
order births. On average, families were induced to have an additional child slightly earlier 
than planned, but there was no effect on total fertility. A closer look at different parities 
suggests families with one child seem to have reacted immediately by postponing the second 
child when the election promise to cap childcare fees was announced, perhaps to make sure 
the reform was actually launched before they went ahead and had their second child. There 
was however no significant overall effect on second births. For families with two or more 
children, we find a statistically weak positive fertility response to the reduction in childcare 
costs.  In  addition  to  marginal  cost  changes,  families  with  children  also  benefitted  from 
reductions in the child care costs for the children they already had. There is weak evidence 
that families with two or more children reduced their fertility in response to this income 
transfer suggesting a negative income effect. We find evidence of stronger effects for low 
income households. Furthermore for first births the positive fertility effects of the reform is 
stronger in municipalities with a high share of votes for the Social Democrats, the political 
party that first announced the childcare reform as an election promise and then implemented 
the reform once in office. 
Before we present the data, discuss our identification strategy in some detail, and arrive at 
estimation results, we provide background information on Swedish childcare institutions and   5 
the design of the childcare reform of 2002. We also describe recent developments regarding 
birth rates for Swedish women. 
2   Institutional background 
2.1  Childcare in Sweden 
Sweden has a long tradition of publicly subsidized childcare for pre-school children and after-
school care for young school-age children. Figure 1 shows the fraction of children attending 
some  form  of  publicly  subsidized  childcare  over  time,  by  age.  Enrollment  rates  have 
increased dramatically, and in 2004, 90 percent of all children in the 3–6 age group attended 
childcare.
3  The  enrollment  rate  is  also  high  for  very  young  children  (aged  1 –2).  One 
explanation for these high enrollment rates is that local governments in Sweden are obliged 
by law to provide highly subsidized, high-quality childcare for children aged 1–12 whose 
parents  either  work  or  are  full-time  students;  care  is  to  be  arranged  within  three  to  four 
months of the parents' request.
4 Subsidized childcare for infants is, however, restricted to 
families and children with special needs, and hence, enrollment for infants is negligible.
5 
                                                 
3 Publicly subsidized childcare comes in different forms, the most common being center-based care. Different 
forms of family daycare—e.g., care provided in a publicly-paid caretaker‘s home or in the child‘s home—also 
exist, although to a rather small extent (in 2001, only 5 percent of all enrolled children had this type of care). 
Although the financing of childcare is public, care providers can be public, cooperative or private. Until the 
early  1990s,  childcare  was  almost  exclusively  publicly  provided;  since  then,  a  growing  proportion  of 
municipalities have introduced voucher systems, paving the way for the private provision of services. These 
private child care centers still have to follow the nationally set curriculum. 
4  There are 290 local governments in Sweden. In addition to arranging childcare, they are responsible for 
primary and secondary education, care of the elder ly and disabled, welfare and local infrastructure. Local 
governments finance their activities through (in order of their importance) proportional local income tax, grants 
from the central government, and user fees.  
5 Infants are instead cared for by their parents. Parents are entitled to a year‘s paid parental leave with an income 
replacement rate of 80 per cent up to a cap.   6 





























1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Children 1-2 years Children 3-6 years
Children 7-9 years Children 10-12 years
 
 Source: National Board of Education (Skolverket) 
 
Daycare  centers  offer  services  during  regular  work  hours.  Enrolled  children  spend  on 
average  32  hours  per  week  at  daycare.  Although  mothers  who  work  full-time  have  their 
children in daycare for longer hours than mothers working half-time (34 vs. 21 hours per 
week in 2005), very few children, even those with both parents working full-time, attend 
daycare more than 40 hours per week.
6 Anecdotal evidence also suggests that strong social 
norms regulate what parents view as adequate staying time. It is therefore interesting to note 
that attendance times did not change during the period of study (Skolverket, 2007), although 
childcare became cheaper. 
Until 2002, the municipalities were free to set their own childcare charges as long as these 
were "reasonable". According to Government Bill 93/94:11, "child care charges must not be 
so high that parents, for economic reasons, refrain from letting their child attend a childcare 
activity that the child would benefit from". This definition clearly left room for different 
interpretations, and  consequently,  childcare fee schedules differed considerably between 
municipalities with respect to both levels and construction. In particular, charges varied with 
family income and the age and number of the children. Some municipalities applied a flat 
charge per child, but most municipalities used complicated fee schedules such that families 
with high incomes and few children  paid the highest charges per child. However, childcare 
                                                 
6 The father‘s work time has a much smaller impact on attendance time. Men are also much less likely to work 
part-time (Skolverket, 2007).   7 
was  heavily  subsidized  in  all  municipalities,  and  only  about  15–20  percent  of  the 
municipalities‘ childcare costs were covered by user charges.  
Quality of daycare, both before and after the reform, has remained relatively homogenous 
both  within  and  across  municipalities.  According  to  Table  1,  which  displays  municipal 
averages  for  some  indicators  of  childcare  quality,  the  total  expenditure  per  child  and 
personnel intensity has not changed dramatically over time. If anything, municipalities spend 
more per enrolled child after the reform than before. Also there is no reason to expect that 
wealthier  families  will  have  access  to  higher-quality  daycare  either  within  a  particular 
municipality or between municipalities. For example, the correlation between the average 
child/teacher ratio and the average income across municipalities in 1999 was virtually zero. A 
reason for this absence of relationship is that childcare subsidies are financed through the 
municipal budget along with several other municipal responsibilities such as care for the 
elderly, education and social welfare.
7 Moreover, user fees are strictly regulated, and hence, 
childcare services can only be adapted to meet parental preferences for quality within a given 
budget. There is therefore no connection between fees paid by a particular parent and the 
quality of the daycare center that the child attends. 
 
Table 1 Municipal level indicators of childcare quality 
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Source: http://www.skolverket.se/sb/d/1663 (The Swedish National Agency for Education) 
                                                 
7 Also differences in income due to differences in the tax base are in principal equalized across municipalities.   8 
2.2  The childcare reform 
In the last months of the election campaign before the 1998 elections, the incumbent (The 
Social Democrats) party proposed a large childcare reform designed to reduce user fees and 
further increase the accessibility of childcare.
8 The Social Democrats won the election, and 
the reform bill was passed by parliament in November 2000. The motivation for the reform 
was i) to give all children equal access to early education ii) to improve economic conditions 
for families with young children, and iii) to promote parental labor force participation.  
The reform was implemented gradually and consisted of several parts. The most important 
component, and the one studied here, was an option for municipalities to ,  beginning in 
January 2002,  impose a cap (set by the central government) on user fees for childcare.
9 
Municipalities that chose to do so were granted compensation (at least partially) for lost 
revenues. As it turned out, all but two municipalities decided to im plement the capped fee 
schedule already in January 2002. The decisions were in most cases made in the fall of 2001. 
The remaining two municipalities implemented the reform in the following year.
10  
The capped fee schedule, which has been in place since the  reform, has two components. 
First, the charge per child is determined as a fixed percentage of household income. The rate 
varies with the age and birth order of the children, such that care for younger children and 
children with few siblings in childcare costs more.
11 Secondly, per-child fees are capped and 
are thus constant beyond a monthly income ceiling, which was SEK 38,000 (6,430 USD) in 
2002.  The  maximum  amount  paid  by  any  household  was  SEK  2,280  (385  USD)  per 
household and per month in 2002.  
Prior to the reform, there was substantial variation in childcare fees across household types 
and municipalities. Since the reform, comparable households have faced similar childcare 
charges regardless of where they live. Overall, childcare became cheaper as a res ult of the 
reform. In 1999, the median middle-income family with two adults and two children in pre -
school paid SEK 2,660 (380 USD) per month, and childcare charges ranged from SEK 1,560 
                                                 
8 Elinder, et al. (2008) analyze the reform‘s impact on voter behavior and find that families with young children 
increased their propensity to vote for the incumbent government. 
9 The reform also introduced a right for children whose parents were unemployed or on parental leave to attend 
childcare for a minimum of 15 hours per week. 
10 These municipalities are not included in the study. 
11 The percentage rate for the first child in preschool is 3 percent; the rate is 2 percent for the second child and 1 
percent for the third child. The corresponding figures for after-school care are 2, 1 and 1 percent. The household 
does not pay anything for child number four or for any children thereafter. The youngest child is defined as child 
number 1. Hence, families with one child in preschool and one in after-school care pay 4 percent of household 
income.   9 
(260 USD) to SEK 3,940 (670 USD) depending on where the family lived (Skolverket, 1999). 
In 2002, after the implementation of the reform, a similar family paid SEK 1,900 (320 USD) 
on average for the care of their two children, and charges ranged between SEK 1,040 (175 
USD) and SEK 1,900 (320 USD) (Skolverket, 2003). Hence, there was also some variation 
after the reform because municipalities were allowed to charge lower fees than indicated in 
the national schedule, a possibility that a tiny minority of the municipalities used. 
2.3  Fertility and maternal labor supply in Sweden 
From a European perspective, the labor force participation of Swedish women is high; it is 
about 88 percent of the male participation rate. Women are, however, more likely to work 
part-time  than  men.  Part-time  work  is  especially  prominent  among  women  with  small 
children. One reason is that parents with small children have a legal right to work shorter 
hours (75 percent of full-time). As is shown in Figure 2, about 80 percent all of women with 
small children are employed, and half of them work part-time. A closer examination of the 
work hours of women with small children shows that there are peaks at 100 and 75 percent, 
respectively (OECD, 2005). Figure 2 shows a slight upward trend in full time employment 
since the 1980‘s but that overall employment is rather stable. The trends are broken in the 
early 1990‘s and to a lesser extent also at a time contemporary with the reform studied in this 
paper.  Both  periods  of  decline  coincide  with  periods  of  increased  unemployment  in  the 
economy as a whole. One may hence be concerned that the reform studied in this paper was 
introduced in response to declines in female employment or that the reform itself had an 
impact  on  female  employment,  as  was  its  aim.  However,  Lundin  et  al  (2008)  find  no 
employment response to the change in childcare prices caused by the reform.  
In  contrast  to  most  OECD  countries,  where  completed  fertility  rates  have  fallen 
considerable over the past few decades, completed fertility in Sweden has remained rather 
stable (see Björklund, 2006). The cohorts of women born 1926–59 had completed fertility 
rates around 2.0, with the highest rate (2.11) for the cohort born in 1943 and lowest rate 
(1.96) for the cohort born in 1945.    10 
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Year
Child 0-2 yrs Child 3-6 yrs
Child 0-2 yrs, full-time Child 3-6 yrs, full-time
 
Source: OECD (2005) 
 
Total fertility rates
12 of Swedish women, however, fluctuate substantially over time. Figure 
3 shows the average number of children born per  woman aged 20–45 in Sweden over the 
period 1968–2006. The figure demonstrates a recession in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
followed by a boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s and lower levels again in the late 
1990s. Total fertility rates have, however, picked up in recent years from an all-time low of 
1.5 in 1999. 
                                                 
12 Total fertility in a given year shows how many children a hypothetical woman would have in her lifetime if 
she had as many children at each age as women of a given age in that particular year.   11 
 
 



























































Source: Statistics Sweden 
 
The fluctuations in total fertility largely mirror the development of the labor market with a 
lag of a few years, suggesting a link between the two. The correlation between total fertility 
and labor market opportunities is likely to depend on the design of the Swedish parental 
benefit system, which requires parents to qualify for income-related benefits by working prior 
to  pregnancy  and  birth.  The  qualifying  rules  provide  a  strong  incentive  for  women  to 
postpone having children until they are established in the labor market (Björklund, 2006).
13 
Interestingly, these aggregate numbers show a slight increase in the number of children 
born after the Swedish childcare reform. Taking a closer look at the  (seasonally adjusted) 
monthly number of births for the years around the reform, we see that  the raw numbers do 
suggest that the increase in the birth rate is rather well timed in relation to the reform.  Figure 
4 shows the monthly number of births in excess of the monthly average for the 1995 –2004 
time period by month from January 1998 through December 2004. The figure suggests that 
there is a take-off in births in spring of 2002. However, given the magnitude of the long-run 
cyclical fluctuations in fertility, we cannot readily interpret this increase as a causal effect of 
                                                 
13 See Adsera (2004, 2005) for discussions of the link between unemployment and fertility in explaining cross-
country differences in fertility.   12 
decreased childcare costs due to the reform. In order to establish a causal link, we need to 
show that the changes in fertility behavior across different types of households are, in fact, 
related to how these household types were affected by the reform. In the next section, we 
discuss the empirical methodology in detail and present the data used to investigate this link. 
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Source: Statistics Sweden.  
The figure displayed for month i year j is (birthsij- mean(birthsi1995-2004)). 
3  Methodology and data 
3.1  Econometric challenge 
3.1.1   Empirical strategy 
The problem that arises when one aims at estimating the effect of childcare costs on fertility 
is that observed childcare costs for a given household are typically determined by household 
characteristics  that  are  also  likely  to  directly  influence  fertility  decisions.  If  the  Swedish 
childcare reform had implied that changes in childcare charges were truly random and thereby 
independent of household characteristics, it would be straightforward to estimate the effect of 
the cost changes on fertility. However, this was not the case. The fees were reduced more for 
some types of households than others. In order to achieve unbiased estimates indicating the 
causal effect of childcare costs on fertility, we therefore need to hold constant all household   13 
characteristics  that  determine  both  childcare  charges  and  fertility  decisions.  In  many 
applications,  this  means  controlling  for  unobserved  characteristics.  However,  a  survey  of 
childcare fees conducted by IFAU (for details, see Section 3.3) shows that fee schedules, both 
before  and  after  the  reform,  are  fully  determined  by  a  subset  of  observable  household 
characteristics, which makes estimating causal effects possible. 
We denote the subset of household characteristics
14 that determines childcare fees by Z 
and  define  J  household  types  as  households  sharing  the  same  characteristics  Zj  where 
j{1,J}, such that in a given municipality m in a given time period, t, all households of type j 
have  identical  childcare  costs.  In  other  words,  for  households  of  type  j,  the  household's 
childcare costs are a function Pmt(Zj). It follows that any variation in childcare costs within 
household type j in a given municipality is a result of changes in the fee schedule P over time. 
All possible direct effects of Zj on fertility can be accounted for by including a fixed effect for 
each municipality-household type Zjm. More formally, we estimate the following relationship: 
 
Childijmt=α+βPmt(Zj)+Zjm+t+εijmt   (1) 
 
where Childijmt is the probability that the woman in household i of type j, in municipality m 
and  in  time  period  t,  bears  a  child,  and  where  t  is  a  time-fixed  effect  controlling  for  a 
common  time  variation  in  fertility.  Including  controls  for  household  characteristics  that 
influence fertility but do not influence childcare costs (e.g., maternal age and education) is not 
necessary  for  unbiased  estimates  of  β,  conditional  on  an  assumption  of  homogenous 
responses to the price change. Including such controls may, however, increase efficiency, 
which is why we will do so in the analysis. See discussion in Smith and Todd (2005). As 
discussed in section 2.3 unemployment may reduce fertility since employment is required to 
qualify for the parental benefit system. We therefore control for the local unemployment rate. 
Our estimation strategy is to compare the probability that the women in households of a 
particular type, in a particular municipality, bear children during a time window of a given 
length prior to the reform to the probability that women in households of that same type in the 
                                                 
14 The variables that determine childcare charges are household income, the number of children and the age of 
each  child.  These  are  all  available  in  Swedish  register  data,  and  it  is  therefore  possible  to  compute  each 
household's exact childcare fee both before and after the reform, on the assumption that all children of childcare-
eligible age are enrolled in full-time childcare. We return to this issue in Section 3.4.   14 
same municipality have children in a time window of the same length after the reform.
15 The 
changes in fertility behavior are then related to the changes in childcare costs induced by the 
reform for the same household type across different municipalities and for other types of 
households  in  the same  municipality.  This  strategy  produces  a  difference -in-differences 
estimator, where households are matched and compared at the household type×municipality 
level. The resulting estimate of  β,  is  the  weighted-sum  over  all  household  types  of  the 
difference-in-differences estimates of fertility changes across municipalities and time within a 
given  household  type,  where  the  weights  are  determined  by  the  number  of  households 
grouped together for each household type j.  
3.1.2  Potential challenges to identification 
The identifying assumption behind equation (1) is that controlling for fixed time-effects and 
household  type×municipality  effect  is  enough  to  capture  everything  that  varies  at  the 
household type level or at the municipality level and also correlates with the reform induced 
changes in childcare costs. One thing that the specification in equation (1) does not allow for 
is trends at the household type level or at the municipality level. If households with certain 
characteristics or households in some municipalities exhibit specific trends that are unrelated 
to the reform but co-varies with the price changes, β can no longer be interpreted as a causal 
effect. This type of pattern may be due to underlying trends, unobserved changes in general 
policy or local reforms. Our strategy to avoid misinterpreting correlations as causations is to 
conduct  placebo-experiments,  where  we  estimate  effects  of  the  childcare  reform  already 
before the reform was announced. If we then find a statistically significant effect of the future 
reform, we will conclude that the model is not correctly specified and re-estimate the model 
allowing for different sets of trends and time-specific effects before interpreting the point 
estimates as causal effects. 
Another issue of concern is whether the childcare reform had effects on the quality of the 
care provided and/or whether access to care was affected as a result of increased demand. 
Such effects could, potentially, confound the effects on fertility of a reduction in fees. As 
regards the provision of care services, the reform is not likely to have had any major impact 
on access to childcare because municipalities had been obliged by law to provide a child with 
                                                 
15 The reason that we compare household of the same type over time rather than to follow the same households over time is 
that the children in the households will be older after the reform than before and we believe that age of already born children  
is very likely to have a direct effect on the fertility behavior of mothers.   15 
childcare  within  3  months  of  parental  demand  as  early  as  1993.  This  obligation  did  not 
change. The reform, however, implied guaranteed access to childcare for a minimum of 15 
hours per week for the children of unemployed persons and parents on parental leave caring 
for new siblings of their older children. These are the reasons for the increase in enrollment 
seen in Figure 1 above. However, as discussed earlier and shown in Table 1, the number of 
enrolled children per childcare employee, as well as the share of childcare employees with 
training in pedagogics, remained constant between 2001 and 2003. Furthermore, if anything, 
the total cost per enrolled child increased slightly between 2001 and 2003. Hence, there is no 
evidence that the reform implied lower-quality childcare. 
Our  identification  strategy  assumes  that  the  reform  induced  cost  changes  for  each 
household-municipality  type  are  exogenous  and  do  not  depend  on  other  characteristics 
affecting  fertility  decisions  and  fees.  It  is  therefore  problematic  if  families  that  were 
insensitive to the cost of childcare were more likely to reside in municipalities with high fees 
prior to the reform. In this case, the households receiving the largest reductions would be the 
least responsive to changes in childcare costs. Such a selection problem might lead us to 
underestimate the impact of the reform on fertility and may potentially bias our results against 
finding any effects. However, it is also possible that fees were high in some municipalities, 
prior  to  the  reform,  in  response  to  an  inflow  of  families  demanding  childcare  for  their 
children. It is not clear how such families bias the results. Another possibility is that the 
reform encouraged families planning more children to move to locations where they would 
receive large fee cuts. The method of reducing the biases resulting from families‘ residence 
decisions due to the reform that we adopt in the analysis is to compute household childcare 
fees and register fertility in the municipality of residence prior to the reform. This implies 
that, if families move in response to the fee cuts we will register childbirths in the wrong 
municipality and, as a result, underestimate the magnitude of the effects. To make sure that 
our results are not driven by the, possibly endogenous, moving patterns of individuals, we 
also perform a robustness check where we exclude households that have recently moved into 
the municipality as well as households that move away from the municipality.    16 
3.2  When do people react to the reform? 
Several years passed between the Social Democrats‘ first launching of the idea of a childcare 
fee reform in 1998 and the actual implementation of the capped fees in 2002. Table 2 below 
presents different important dates for the reform. 








1998  Election promise and election victory of the Social Democrats  July 1999  
1999  The fee reform bill is prepared in the government  July 2000 
2000  Decision made at the central level  July 2001 
2001  Decisions made at the local level  July 2002 
2002  The capped fees implemented  July 2003 
 
It is far from obvious when we should expect household to react to the reduced childcare 
fees. Families or couples with high trust in politicians election promises could potentially 
decide to have an additional child already when the Social Democrats won the election in the 
autumn in 1998.
 16 Taking the nine-month gestation period into account, July 1999 is in that 
case when we can expect to register births that are induced by the reform. If households on 
the other hand did not believe that the reform would be implemented until the reform bill was 
being prepared, the first births affected by the reform would be in July 2000. In 2000 the 
decision was made at the central level to implement the reform, but it was still voluntary for 
municipalities to implement the capped fee-schedules and it was not until the end of 2001 that 
most  local  governments  made  the  final  decisions  to  implement  the  reform.  Hence,  it  is 
possible that it was not until July 2002 that we can start to observe births affected by the 
reform. Most likely, some types of households reacted early whereas other types reacted late. 
In order to account for the uncertainty about when households react, we estimate a reform 
effect for each year before and after the reform. Doing this, we are able to trace the dynamic 
response of household fertility to the reform process. Hence, we estimate a model where we 
first calculate the price change for each household type in year t, given the old and reformed 
fee schedule in each municipality and then inter-act this price change with a time dummy, t, 
                                                 
16 Elinder et al (2008) show that the election promise was credible enough to affect families‘ voting behavior.   17 
producing T-1 β-estimates, where T is the number of years of data. The equation we estimate 
is hence given by  
 
ΔChildjmt=α+βt ΔPm(Zj)+ t + ΔXjmt +Δεjmt,     (2) 
 
where ΔChildjmt is the change in the probability that a household of type j in municipality m 
will have an additional child in a defined time window and ΔXjmt is the change in mean 
characteristics that do not determine childcare fees, but are important for fertility decisions, in 
the household type – municipality cell.
17 In particular, we include maternal age and education 
as a means to improve efficiency. In measuring  ΔChildjmt we define a set of 12-month time 
windows starting in July in each of the years after we observe households and ending in June 
the  next  year.  Hence,  household  characteristics  are  measured  in  December  of  year  t  for 
t=[1,…,T],  childcare  fees  are  computed  for  January  of  year  t+1  onwards,  and  fertility 
behavior is measures from July of year t+1 through June t+2. 
3.3  Data 
We  use  data  from  The  Institute  for  Labour  Market  Policy  Evaluation  (IFAU),  Statistics 
Sweden and the Swedish Public Employment Service. Information on fee schedules comes 
from a survey of municipal childcare charge tariffs conducted by IFAU.
18 Information on 
household characteristics and fertility comes from register data from Statis tics Sweden, and 
data on the local unemployment rate from the Swedish Public Employment Service.  
We sample all couples in which the woman is 20 –45 years old in each year 1996–2003, 
since these are the women ―at risk‖ of being affected by the price change. Thus, we define 
household characteristics 1996 and births July 1997 to July 1998, characteristics 1997 and 
births July 1998 to July 1999, and so forth. Each year we exclude women that gave birth in 
the previous 6 months, i.e. Jan–June since these are not at risk of having another child. The 
selected time period implies that we have two years of data that are undoubtedly unaffected 
by the reform. This makes it possible to perform one true placebo-experiment, comparing 
                                                 
17 Note that the model is estimated on first differences at the household type - municipal level which implies that any level 
effects are differences out. 
18 IFAU collected childcare fee data via an email request sent to all Swedish municipalities asking for exact 
formulas used to calculate prices in 2001–04. Information about the exact fee structure from 220 of Sweden's 
290 municipalities was received. Comparing the pre-reform childcare costs for a number of type families in the 
municipalities that responded with those of the municipalities that did not respond (available in Skolverket, 
1999), we conclude that the costs are very similar, which implies that we need not worry about selection based 
on a specific type of municipality.   18 
changes in fertility for the sample of households 1996 to 1997 to changes in behavior for the 
1997 and 1998 samples. The reason for not going further back in time is that the pre-reform 
fee schedules collected through the survey were those that were in place in 2001, and we do 
not have information about the schedules actually in place prior to this year. Therefore, the 
further back in time we go, the larger will the measurement error in our price measure be. 
Because Swedish register data does not code cohabiting couples without common children 
as household units, our sample excludes unmarried women without children, single mothers, 
and cohabiting unmarried mothers whose partners are not the fathers of their children. For 
these women, we are unable to obtain a correct measure of household income because we 
cannot identify the potential father.
19 As a result, our analysis of first births is restricted to 
married couples. This is unfortunate because a high fraction of Swedish first-borns, more than 
two thirds, are born out of wedlock (www.SCB.se). The   results we present for childless 
women are therefore not representative of the population of childless women because married 
couples are likely to differ from unmarried couples in several respects. It is, however, not 
clear if they should be expected to be more or less sensitive to changes in childcare fees than 
unmarried couples. Our analysis for higher order births covers more or less the full Swedish 
population. 
For the households in our sample, we obtain register -based information on the woman‘s 
age and education, the annual income for the woman and her partner, and the number of 
children living in the household and their respective ages. We also obtain register information 
on if and when the women give birth. 
3.4  Computing childcare costs and birth rates 
As  was  described  above,  childcare  charges  depend  on  a  limited  number  of  observable 
household characteristics. Given knowledge of these characteristics from register data, we 
compute  the  present  values  of  households‘  exact  future  childcare  costs.  We  compute  the 
marginal  cost  of  having  one  additional  child  by  calculating  the  present  value  of  total 
remaining cost of childcare assuming that the newborn will be enrolled in childcare at age one 
                                                 
19 We have tried to impute household income for these unmarried childless women using predictions from the 
sample for which we observe both parents. Because we were unable to replicate our results for the married 
women using predicted household income, we judge that the results for unmarried childless women are too 
speculative and uncertain.   19 
and  continue  in  childcare  until  age  ten.
20  We expect a negative effect  of the marginal 
childcare cost on households‘ fertility decisions. 
For households that already have children attending childcare, the reform also implied an 
income effect, since it became cheaper to have these children in childcare. We therefore also 
compute a measure of the present value of total remaining cost of childcare for the children 
already present in the household assuming that each child will be enrolled in full-time care 
until it reaches the age of ten (cost of presently enrolled).  
Table 3 presents the present value of the remaining childcare costs according to the pre- 
and post-reform fee schedules for a marginal additional child (MC=marginal cost) and the 
children already present in households with children (SQ=status quo) (Columns 1 and 2) and 
for having a first child for households without children (MC=marginal cost) (Column 3) for 
the true reform year, 2002. When computing pre-reform costs, we apply the pre-reform fee 
schedules reported in survey responses.
 21 Post-reform costs are computed using the reform 
fee schedule as it was stipulated by central government, thus assuming that the capped fees 
were implemented in the same way across the country.  
As is clear from Table 3, comparing the pre-reform and post-reform costs for childcare, 
these  decreased  dramatically  due  to  the  reform.  On  average,  the  net  present  value  of 
remaining  childcare  costs  decreased  by  more  than  50  percent.  The  drop  in  the  standard 
deviation of childcare costs also shows that the variation in fees across households decreased 
radically when the reformed national fee schedule replaced local fee schedules.  
                                                 
20 Note that we do not observe whether children attend childcare or for how many hours they do so. The cost 
measure we calculate is based on the assumption that everyone attends childcare and after-school care full-time. 
As a sensitivity test, we will also calculate the costs assuming that children do not attend after-school care.  We 
have further assumed that the families discount future costs exponentially with the discount rate 0.05. Within 
reasonable limits, the results are not sensitive to the choice of discount factor.  
21 The information collected by IFAU pertains to the fee schedules as they were in 2001. Information on prices 
scheduled prior to 2001 is not available, but the survey information suggests that there were no major changes in 
local fee schedules in the years prior to the reform. As a result, we use the fee sch edule for 2001 to compute 
what the household pre-reform fee was in the years prior to 2001. Although inflation was minor during these 
years, we have denominated household incomes in 2001 prices using a consumer price index in order to achieve 
comparability across years.   20 
 
Table 3 Present value of pre-reform and post-reform remaining childcare costs in SEK ‗000s. 
  Households with children  Households without 
children 
  Marginal cost of  
additional child, MC 
Cost of presently 
enrolled children, SQ 
Marginal cost of 

















Note: Average values. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Household characteristics from 2000. When calculating 
present values, we have used a discount rate of 0.02. 
 
The capping of childcare charges implied that the largest cost cuts occurred for households 
that initially had high childcare costs. In order to encourage a better understanding of which 
type of households experienced the largest cost reductions, Table 4 shows changes in total 
remaining childcare costs (marginal cost + cost for presently enrolled) at different parity and 
household income levels. Note that the largest cost changes occurred for well-off families that 
already had two children, while low-income households without children received a much 
smaller reduction in childcare cost. Although the within-family variation in childcare cost 
changes was smaller for families with low incomes or few children, Table 4 also illustrates 
that  the  reform  introduced  substantial  variation  in  costs  reductions  for  households  with 
similar incomes and the same number of children.    21 
 
Table 4 Change in present value of total remaining childcare cost for a household 
experiencing the birth of one additional child, SEK ‗000s.   
Parity  Household income 
  Low  Medium  High 
       






       






       






       
Note: Average values. Standard deviations in parenthesis. Household characteristics from 2000. Total remaining 
child cost =MC +SQ 
 
3.5  Defining household types 
The estimation strategy discussed in section 3.1.1. relies on comparisons of households that 
are identical with respect to all factors affecting both childcare fees and fertility but that 
experience different changes in childcare costs because they live in different municipalities. 
To achieve such a comparison, we need i) to define household types based on income, the 
number of children and the age of the children; and ii) to observe each household type in at 
least two municipalities, both before and after the reform. In defining household types, we 
therefore face a trade-off. The more narrowly we define household types, the more precisely 
is  our  measure  of  childcare  costs,  the  smaller  is  the  within-household  variance  in 
characteristics that determine childcare  charges  and, hence, the more truly random  is  the 
within-household variation in childcare costs. The drawback of defining household types too 
narrowly is that we are less likely find matches over time for the same household type in at 
least  two  municipalities.  Hence,  the  more  precise  are  our  household  types,  the  less 
representative is the sample used for estimation. 
This  problem  is  fruitfully  illustrated  by  the  example  of  household  income.  Household 
income is a continuous variable, and it is therefore not possible to perform an unconstrained 
match. Doing so would prevent us from finding matches for most of our household types. 
Instead, we use monthly income spans of SEK 1,000 in 2002 prices. When attempting to   22 
match the exact age of each child, a similar problem arises. Instead, we choose to define 
household types by the number of children under the age of 10, the exact age of the youngest 
child and the age category of each of the next three youngest children, and the household‘s 
monthly income span. We consider the four youngest children in the household because only 
a few municipalities before the reform (and none after) charged fees for the fifth child or any 
thereafter. The age categories are defined in line with the typical age categories determining 
childcare charges: 1–3, 4–5 and 6–9.  
4  Results: Effects of childcare costs on fertility 
4.1  Baseline estimates 
There are two different groups of potential parents that are likely to be affected by the reform 
differently;  households  with  children  and  households  with  no  previous  children.  For  the 
former group the reform has both an income and a price effect, whereas for households with 
no previous children there is only a price effect. We will therefore estimate the model in 
equation (2) for each group separately. Note that the model is estimated on first differences at 
the household type - municipal level which implies that any level effects are differences out. 
Year fixed effects in this context imply that we identify fertility effects of changes in child 
care costs on deviations from average year to year changes in fertility, i.e. deviations from 
trend. 
Table  5  presents  the  result  for  families  without  children.
22  First we inspect the 
estimate on the first row, ΔMC_1997. Since the capped fee reform was first presented as an 
election promise in 1998 there could be no  effect of the reform for the first  year in our 
estimations. The estimate for ΔMC_1997 is small and insignificant, and suggests that there 
are no underlying trends in the specification. This specification will be our preferred one. 
                                                 
22 This sample only includes married couples, since register data does not allow us to capture cohabiting couples without 
common children.   23 
 
Table 5 Child care costs and fertility – Households without children 
Variables  ΔChild births per 1,000 women 
   
ΔMC_1997  -0.00673 
  (0.0570) 
ΔMC_1998  -0.108 
  (0.0698) 
ΔMC_1999  -0.0795 
  (0.0632) 
ΔMC_2000  -0.126** 
  (0.0634) 
ΔMC_2001  -0.0342 
  (0.0639) 
ΔMC_2002  -0.0385 
  (0.0604) 
ΔMC_2003  -0.0468 
  (0.0687) 
ΔWoman‘s age  -15.91*** 
  (0.314) 
ΔUniversity degree  53.33*** 
  (4.667) 
ΔUnemployment  -1.185 
  (2.586) 
   
Year FE  Yes 
   




Observations  44,876 
R-squared  0.117 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the 10%-
level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Household types are defined by household monthly income 
span of 1,000 SEK 
 
Turning to the other estimates we see that for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000 the point 
estimates are in the range -0.108– -0.126, indicating that higher marginal childcare costs do 
indeed decrease fertility. In other words, the reform induced reduction in child care costs lead 
to increased fertility for couples without children. However, the only statistically significant 
point estimate is the one for 2000, suggesting that households reacted more consistently when 
the reform was passed in the parliament (see Table 2). Testing the joint significance of the 
annual effects gives a highly significant F-statistic, suggesting that there is a positive effect on 
first births of reducing childcare prices. A childless couple facing an average reduction in fees 
of SEK 111,000 (see Table A2) increased fertility by 9.8 percent compared to the average rate   24 
in 1998. (111x0.126/142.7). This effect is indeed large, but the average reduction of childcare 
cost was also large and corresponded to roughly a quarter of one year of household earnings 
for average childless couples.  The magnitude of the effect implies that a 10,000 US dollar 
reduction in the present value of the future marginal child care costs would increase fertility 
rates with 5.7 percent. The pattern of negative (but insignificant) estimates already for the 
years 1998 and 1999 may suggest that a subgroup of the households anticipated the reform 
already when the Social Democrats won the election and reacted by having children. 
The  control  variables;  the  woman‘s  age  and  education  level  are  highly  significant. 
Younger  women  are  more  likely  to  have  children  than  older  women  and  more  highly 
educated women with a university degree are more likely to have a child than women with 
lower education. It is worth noting that we are making the comparison between more and less 
educated women or younger and older women, given household income. It is possible that 
more educated women that belong to the same household type as less educated women are 
more family oriented (as opposed to career oriented), explaining why higher education is 
associated with higher fertility. Changes in local unemployment do however not seem to 
affect families‘ fertility decisions. The estimated coefficient has the expected negative sign 
but is not statistically significant. 
Next we turn to the households who already have children in childcare age. The results are 
presented in Table 6 below. Column (1) presents the result from the specification given by 
equation (2), i.e. a difference-in-difference specification at the household type × municipality 
level. Since the reform was first mentioned in the election campaign 1998 we should not 
expect to find any effect of the reform for the first year in our estimations (i.e. ΔMC_1997 and 
ΔSQ_1997). However, as is clear from the results, we do find statistically (and economically) 
significant  coefficients  on  the  variables  capturing  the  future  changes  in  prices  (both  for 
marginal cost and the ―status quo‖-costs). These estimates suggest a presence of preexisting 
time trends in the birth rates of household types that that correlate with future price changes. 
In column (2) we therefore estimate a model where we control for time-specific household 
type-effects.
23 Doing this, we find  that the estimates for  the pre-reform year 1997 are both 
statistically and economically insignificant. The specification in column (2) will therefore be 
our preferred specification. 
                                                 
23 We have also elaborated with a linear household-type trend, and a linear municipality trend respectively. Doing this, we 
still find an effect the first year, and we therefore reject those specifications. These results are available upon request.    25 
Turning to the parameter estimates for effects of a change in marginal cost on fertility in 
column  (2)  there  is  a  marginally  significant  negative  effect  in  1999.  This  indicates  that 
households with children reacted slightly earlier than households without children, i.e. when 
the proposal was prepared. The size of the parameter estimate is -0.081, which is a smaller 
effect than for households without children. If we compare the corresponding impact of the 
average reduction in child care fees of SEK 77,000 to the pre-reform average birth rate for 
families  with  children  the  impact  of  the  reform  was  to  increase  births  by  9  percent 
(77x0.087/74.4).  This  effect  is  similar  in  magnitude  to  the  effect  for  childless  couples 
although their average reduction in childcare cost was smaller relative to household annual 
earnings for families and corresponded to about a fifth of a year‘s earnings. Note that the 
estimates for the other years in which households could potentially have reacted, are not 
going in the same (negative) direction. In fact, a test of the joint significance of the effect of 
cost changes on fertility for 1998–2003 shows that there is no statistically significant overall 
effect.  A possible interpretation is that the child care fee reform had an impact on the timing 
of births, causing families to have an additional child slightly earlier than planned, but that 
there was no effect on total fertility. For families with children, the reform reduced childcare 
costs also for the children already enrolled, creating a positive income transfer. Our estimates 
(the  ΔSQ-estimates)  indicate  that  there  are  no  statistically  significant  income-effects  on 
fertility behavior induced by the reform. There is, however, a positive estimate of a non-
negligible  magnitude  for  the  year  1998  suggesting,  if  anything,  a  possible  presence  of 
negative income effects.  
   26 
Table 6 Childcare costs and fertility – Households with children 
Variables  ΔChild births per 1,000 women 
     
ΔMC_1997  0.0504***  -0.000905 
  (0.0177)  (0.0340) 
ΔMC_1998  0.0373**  0.0115 
  (0.0177)  (0.0374) 
ΔMC_1999  -0.0339*  -0.0811* 
  (0.0188)  (0.0418) 
ΔMC_2000  0.0359*  0.0474 
  (0.0186)  (0.0314) 
ΔMC_2001  -0.00818  -0.00163 
  (0.0165)  (0.0256) 
ΔMC_2002  0.219***  -0.0299 
  (0.0287)  (0.0256) 
ΔMC_2003  0.0217  0.00325 
  (0.0165)  (0.0318) 
ΔSQ_1997  -0.0775***  -0.0119 
  (0.0161)  (0.0424) 
ΔSQ_1998  0.0223  0.0871 
  (0.0210)  (0.0544) 
ΔSQ_1999  -0.0393**  0.0105 
  (0.0153)  (0.0364) 
ΔSQ_2000  -0.00511  -0.00452 
  (0.0184)  (0.0392) 
ΔSQ_2001  -0.0459***  -0.0429 
  (0.0175)  (0.0438) 
ΔSQ_2002  -0.241***  0.0289 
  (0.0235)  (0.0479) 
ΔSQ_2003  0.00392  0.00110 
  (0.0163)  (0.0403) 
ΔWoman‘s age  -8.332***  -8.203*** 
  (0.110)  (0.112) 
ΔUniversity degree  25.84***  26.07*** 
  (0.877)  (0.877) 
ΔUnemployment  -0.298  -0.135 
  (0.597)  (0.626) 
     
Year FE  Yes  Yes 
Household type×year FE  No  Yes 
     
F-test ΔMC_1998– 
ΔMC_2003 (p-value) 




  1.69 
(0.1950) 
Observations  628,036  628,036 
R-squared  0.023  0.069 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the 10%-
level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Household types are defined by the number of children under 
the age of 10, the exact age of the youngest child, the age category (ages 0–3, 4–5, 6–9) of the next three 
youngest children and a household monthly income span of 1,000 SEK.  
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4.2  Robustness tests  
In  the  analysis  above,  we  have  let  ―data  speak‖  in  the  sense  that  we  have  accepted  the 
specifications of the models if the placebo-results have shown zero-effects. For households 
without children, this implied accepting the DD-specification without additional trends. For 
households  with  children,  zero-effects  in  the  placebo  tests  required  a  specification  with 
household-type time-specific effects. The identification hence relies on the assumption that 
such  effects  are  not  important  for  households  without  children  and  that  there  are  no 
underlying municipal trends. We next conduct a number of checks introducing different types 
of trends to test the robustness of our results. However, one should be aware that including 
trends does not come without a cost; the more trends we allow for, less of the identifying 
variation is used in the estimations. 
According to the results in Table 5 households without children reacted to the price change 
by  increasing  fertility.  The  results  presented  in  Table  7  in  columns  (1)  and  (2)  include 
household type×year fixed effects and municipality specific trends, respectively. Including 
household  type  and  time  fixed  effects  reduces  the  estimates  somewhat  and  increases  the 
standard errors substantially. Although the estimates are no longer statistically significant the 
general picture is the same as in the preferred baseline specification presented in Table 5. 
When including municipality specific trends, the effect of marginal childcare costs on fertility 
becomes stronger, and  also the estimates for 1998 and 1999 are  (marginally) statistically 
significant on the 10 percent level. 
Because one may worry that the results are driven by endogenous residence decisions we 
next re-estimate our preferred specifications excluding households that either recently moved 
to the municipality or moved from the municipality in the year of investigation. The results 
presented in column (3) show that this does not affect the results. 
Finally, when calculating the changes in childcare fees we have assumed that all children 
in the household attend full-time childcare until 10 years of age. Enrollment rates however 
fall somewhat as children get older, as is also evident from Figure 1. We have therefore re-
calculated the changes in childcare fees assuming that children only attend childcare until the 
age of 6. The resulting estimates that are presented in column (4) show more or less the same 
pattern as the baseline results.  
The robustness checks in Table 7 support our conclusion that the childcare fee reform 
induced married couples with no former children to increase their fertility.   28 
  
Table 7 Robustness checks – Households without children 
Variables  ΔChild births per 1,000 women 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
ΔMC_1997  0.0286  -0.0303  -0.0123  -0.0967 
  (0.0890)  (0.0573)  (0.0579)  (0.105) 
ΔMC_1998  -0.0519  -0.131*  -0.0928  -0.0971 
  (0.0895)  (0.0707)  (0.0721)  (0.129) 
ΔMC_1999  -0.0549  -0.103*  -0.0893  -0.0782 
  (0.0838)  (0.0613)  (0.0664)  (0.0950) 
ΔMC_2000  -0.0695  -0.155**  -0.140**  -0.239** 
  (0.0778)  (0.0669)  (0.0676)  (0.106) 
ΔMC_2001  0.00939  -0.0614  -0.0287  -0.108 
  (0.0856)  (0.0624)  (0.0666)  (0.110) 
ΔMC_2002  -0.00803  -0.0651  -0.0488  -0.0579 
  (0.0753)  (0.0610)  (0.0639)  (0.0932) 
ΔMC_2003  0.00819  -0.0709  -0.0673  -0.0595 
  (0.0914)  (0.0688)  (0.0678)  (0.108) 
         
Control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Household type×year 
FE 
Yes  No  No  No 
Municipality trend  No  Yes  No  No 
Excluding movers  No  No  Yes  No 
Age of children 
attending childcare 
1–9  1–9  1–9  1–5 












         
Observations  44,876  44,876  44,876  43,417 
R-squared  0.145  0.119  0.117  0.118 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the 10%-
level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Household types are defined by household monthly income 
span of 1,000 SEK. Control variables are woman‘s age and education, and local unemployment. 
 
Next, we turn to households that already have children in ages eligible for subsidized child 
care and test the robustness of the results that were presented in Table 6. Column (1) in Table 
8  presents  the  results  when  including  municipality  specific  trends  to  the  baseline 
specification. This does not change the results. Column (2) shows the preferred specification 
from Table 6 but excluding movers. This does not change the results found above; there is a 
price effect in 1999 of the expected sign, but when summing the effect between 1998-2003 
there is no statistically significant effect. Column (3) shows the same specification as column   29 
(2), but without excluding movers, and assuming that children aged 6 to 9 are not enrolled in 
childcare.  
Table 8 Robustness checks – Households with children 
Variables  ΔChild births per 1,000 women 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
ΔMC_1997  0.00243  0.00490  -0.0650 
  (0.0344)  (0.0335)  (0.0450) 
ΔMC_1998  0.0126  0.0138  0.0460 
  (0.0372)  (0.0380)  (0.0394) 
ΔMC_1999  -0.0795*  -0.0725*  -0.0871 
  (0.0425)  (0.0413)  (0.0606) 
ΔMC_2000  0.0493  0.0411  0.0495 
  (0.0317)  (0.0295)  (0.0504) 
ΔMC_2001  0.000105  0.00402  -0.0220 
  (0.0264)  (0.0237)  (0.0480) 
ΔMC_2002  -0.0284  -0.0371  -0.0116 
  (0.0277)  (0.0260)  (0.0398) 
ΔMC_2003  0.00487  -0.00303  -0.00160 
  (0.0331)  (0.0326)  (0.0501) 
ΔSQ_1997  -0.00599  -0.00114  0.0427 
  (0.0430)  (0.0431)  (0.0640) 
ΔSQ_1998  0.0918  0.0813  0.124 
  (0.0556)  (0.0541)  (0.0798) 
ΔSQ_1999  0.0164  -0.00400  -0.0102 
  (0.0366)  (0.0369)  (0.0691) 
ΔSQ_2000  0.000367  0.00502  0.0224 
  (0.0391)  (0.0398)  (0.0798) 
ΔSQ_2001  -0.0387  -0.0544  -0.0967 
  (0.0457)  (0.0440)  (0.0878) 
ΔSQ_2002  0.0327  0.0260  0.0800 
  (0.0472)  (0.0500)  (0.0946) 
ΔSQ_2003  0.00509  -0.00644  -0.0439 
  (0.0415)  (0.0427)  (0.0745) 
       
Control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Household type×year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Municipality trend  Yes  No  No 
Excluding movers  No  Yes  No 
Age of children attending 
childcare 
1–9  1–9  1–5 



















Observations  628,036  613,208  628,036 
R-squared  0.069  0.070  0.069   30 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the 10%-
level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Household types are defined by the number of children under 
the age of 10, the exact age of the youngest child, the age category (ages 0–3, 4–5, 6–9) of the next three 
youngest children and a household monthly income span of 1,000 SEK. Control variables are woman‘s age and 
education, and local unemployment. 
 
4.2 Heterogeneous effects with respect to the number of children 
From  our  preferred  specification  in  Table  6  we  concluded  that  there  is  a  marginally 
significant price effect and an insignificant income effect working in opposite directions for 
families with children. The F-tests of the total effects of the price and income effects of the 
reform, however, suggested that it did not affect total fertility. Thus, if anything, the change 
in the marginal cost made families change the timing of their demand for children. In the 
group ―families with children‖ households differ with respect to how many children they have 
before  the  reform  and  it  is  possible  that  effects  differ  by  parity.  We  therefore  allow  the 
parameter estimates to differ for families with only one child and families with two or more 
children.  Column  (1)  presents  the  results  from  the  preferred  baseline  model,  column  (2) 
includes  municipality  specific  trends  and  (3)  excludes  movers.  The  results  confirm  that 
households  do  in  fact  react  differently  to  the  reform  depending  on  parity.  Interestingly, 
households with one child seem to have reacted to the lower marginal costs induced by the 
reform by postponing their second child one  year (there is positive effect in 1998 and a 
negative effect in 1999). Thus they postponed having children until the proposal was prepared 
in the government. For this group the coefficient estimates suggest a presence of a negative 
income effect but it not significant because standard errors are large. Also, F-tests show that 
there are no significant overall effects on second births of reducing child care costs.  
For  households  with  two  or  more  children,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  sign  of 
postponing births and instead a weakly statistically significant effect for 1998 suggesting that 
expectations  of  reduced  fees  increased  fertility.  A  test  of  joint  significance  of  the  price 
variables 1998–2003 also suggests a marginally significant total effect. For families with two 
or more children there is a significant negative income effect 1998, which is not completely 
cancelled  out  by  effects  in  the  opposite  direction  later  on,  as  suggested  by  a  marginally 
significant F-test. For this group of families the average reduction in marginal childcare costs 
amounted to SEK 71,000, or 18 percent of a year‘s family earnings, which implies that the 
reform  increased  fertility  with  some  14.5  per  cent  (71x0.07/34.3).  For  these  families  the 
reform  induced  positive  income  shock  amounted  to  on  average  SEK  74,000,  which 
corresponds to 19 percent of annual earnings. The income effect estimate of 0.099 implies a   31 
negative effect on fertility in the order of magnitude of 22 percent (74x0.99/34). Columns 2 
and 3 show that the results are not very sensitive to the inclusion of municipality trends, but 
the overall income effect is no longer significant when excluding movers.  
Table 9 Childcare costs and fertility – heterogeneous effects with respect to parity 
Variables  ΔChild births per 1,000 women 
       
ΔMC1_1997  -0.00431  0.000324  -0.00133 
  (0.0498)  (0.0493)  (0.0475) 
ΔMC1_1998  0.0722*  0.0745*  0.0835** 
  (0.0412)  (0.0415)  (0.0404) 
ΔMC1_1999  -0.129**  -0.127**  -0.120** 
  (0.0562)  (0.0568)  (0.0552) 
ΔMC1_2000  0.0548  0.0575  0.0429 
  (0.0501)  (0.0503)  (0.0475) 
ΔMC1_2001  -0.0234  -0.0208  -0.0162 
  (0.0361)  (0.0370)  (0.0344) 
ΔMC1_2002  -0.0361  -0.0337  -0.0354 
  (0.0309)  (0.0334)  (0.0314) 
ΔMC1_2003  0.0559  0.0591  0.0483 
  (0.0371)  (0.0384)  (0.0368) 
ΔSQ1_1997  0.0682  0.0745  0.0985 
  (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.104) 
ΔSQ1_1998  0.117  0.124  0.111 
  (0.118)  (0.121)  (0.119) 
ΔSQ1_1999  -0.0282  -0.0203  -0.0516 
  (0.0875)  (0.0881)  (0.0869) 
ΔSQ1_2000  0.0357  0.0416  0.0748 
  (0.0983)  (0.0976)  (0.0979) 
ΔSQ1_2001  -0.0355  -0.0310  -0.0462 
  (0.0991)  (0.101)  (0.0971) 
ΔSQ1_2002  0.0751  0.0794  0.0248 
  (0.121)  (0.120)  (0.126) 
ΔSQ1_2003  -0.178  -0.172  -0.176 
  (0.138)  (0.139)  (0.143) 
ΔMC2_1997  -0.00379  -0.00244  0.00387 
  (0.0293)  (0.0312)  (0.0301) 
ΔMC2_1998  -0.0692*  -0.0700*  -0.0781* 
  (0.0392)  (0.0377)  (0.0414) 
ΔMC2_1999  -0.0127  -0.0129  -0.00477 
  (0.0357)  (0.0368)  (0.0371) 
ΔMC2_2000  0.0341  0.0348  0.0347 
  (0.0236)  (0.0238)  (0.0245) 
ΔMC2_2001  0.0327  0.0329  0.0359 
  (0.0362)  (0.0374)  (0.0372) 
ΔMC2_2002  -0.0258  -0.0258  -0.0396 
  (0.0375)  (0.0373)  (0.0403) 
ΔMC2_2003  -0.0508  -0.0519  -0.0575 
  (0.0413)  (0.0429)  (0.0454) 
ΔSQ2_1997  -0.0389  -0.0318  -0.0352   32 
  (0.0287)  (0.0304)  (0.0294) 
ΔSQ2_1998  0.0986**  0.104**  0.0962** 
  (0.0455)  (0.0457)  (0.0470) 
ΔSQ2_1999  0.00591  0.0124  -0.00516 
  (0.0364)  (0.0368)  (0.0372) 
ΔSQ2_2000  -0.0179  -0.0123  -0.0231 
  (0.0320)  (0.0320)  (0.0341) 
ΔSQ2_2001  -0.0573  -0.0520  -0.0685* 
  (0.0380)  (0.0413)  (0.0399) 
ΔSQ2_2002  0.0160  0.0207  0.0272 
  (0.0501)  (0.0489)  (0.0531) 
ΔSQ2_2003  0.0495  0.0544  0.0407 
  (0.0370)  (0.0388)  (0.0396) 
       
Control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Household type×year 
FE 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Municipal trend  No  Yes  No 
Excluding movers  No  No  Yes 




MC1: 0.01 (0.9266) 
MC2: 2.96 (0.0865) 
MC1: 0.01 (0.9055) 
MC2: 2.00 (0.1591) 
MC1: 0.00 (0.9545) 




SQ1: 0.01 (0.9401) 
SQ2: 2.83 (0.0938) 
SQ1: 0.01 (0.9144) 
SQ2: 3.02 (0.0836) 
SQ1: 0.12 (0.7257) 
SQ2: 1.25 (0.2639) 
Observations  628,036  628,036  613,208 
R-squared  0.069  0.069  0.070 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the 10%-
level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Household types are defined by the number of children under 
the age of 10, the exact age of the youngest child, the age category (ages 0–3, 4–5, 6–9) of the next three 
youngest children and a household monthly income span of 1,000 SEK. Control variables are woman‘s age and 
education, and local unemployment. 
 
4.3  Heterogeneous effects with respect to household income 
Next, we investigate if households with different income levels respond differently to the 
changes  in  child care costs.  Arguably, low income households may be more sensitive to 
changes in childcare costs. We estimate our baseline specifications separately for households 
below  and  above  the  median  of  household  earnings  for  households  without  children  and 
families with children respectively. The results are presented in Table 10.   33 
 Table 10 Heterogenous effects: Household income  
Variables  ΔChild births per 1,000 women 
  Households w/o children  Households with children 
  Low income  High income  Low income  High income 
         
ΔMC_1997  -0.0217  0.119  -0.0337  0.0316 
  (0.0850)  (0.112)  (0.0510)  (0.0318) 
ΔMC_1998  -0.0318  -0.0824  0.0988  -0.0536* 
  (0.124)  (0.111)  (0.0679)  (0.0299) 
ΔMC_1999  0.142  -0.150  -0.153**  -0.0382 
  (0.120)  (0.107)  (0.0659)  (0.0350) 
ΔMC_2000  -0.215**  0.0184  0.162**  -0.00149 
  (0.109)  (0.0956)  (0.0712)  (0.0239) 
ΔMC_2001  0.138  0.0136  0.0398  -0.0186 
  (0.118)  (0.100)  (0.0524)  (0.0239) 
ΔMC_2002  -0.235**  0.0668  0.00934  -0.0484* 
  (0.107)  (0.0832)  (0.0635)  (0.0258) 
ΔMC_2003  -0.0978  0.0239  0.0256  -0.00601 
  (0.145)  (0.0992)  (0.0643)  (0.0293) 
ΔSQ_1997      0.0115  -0.0393 
      (0.0562)  (0.0576) 
ΔSQ_1998      0.0674  0.0811 
      (0.0728)  (0.0622) 
ΔSQ_1999      -0.000256  0.0448 
      (0.0563)  (0.0439) 
ΔSQ_2000      0.0265  -0.0553 
      (0.0650)  (0.0534) 
ΔSQ_2001      -0.0264  -0.0651 
      (0.0630)  (0.0607) 
ΔSQ_2002      -0.0399  0.0755 
      (0.0685)  (0.0612) 
ΔSQ_2003      -0.0102  0.00362 
      (0.0550)  (0.0527) 
         
Control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Household 
type×year FE 
No  No  Yes  Yes 



















Observations  21,905  22,971  365,534  262,502 
R-squared  0.096  0.144  0.050  0.106 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the 10%-
level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Household types are defined by the number of children under 
the age of 10, the exact age of the youngest child, the age category (ages 0–3, 4–5, 6–9) of the next three 
youngest children and a household monthly income span of 1,000 SEK. Control variables are woman‘s age and 
education, and local unemployment.   34 
 
Columns 1 and 2 display the results for households without children. They confirm that the 
reduction in childcare costs had a significant impact on low income couples and insignificant 
impact on high income couples. Columns 3 and 4 show the results for families with children. 
While low income households respond strongly and have significantly more children in 1999, 
there are insignificant effects in the opposite direction the year before and the year after. A 
possible interpretation is that some low income families time births to benefit from lower 
costs, but that total fertility is not affected. For high income families, there is an immediate 
positive effect on fertility of reduced marginal costs and the absence of positive coefficients 
suggests that total fertility may have been affected. The estimated income effects show a 
similar pattern as for the entire sample, but standard errors are large and hence estimated 
effects are insignificant. 
4.4  Heterogeneous effects with respect to voting patterns 
The studied reform was the result of an election promise of the Social Democrats. The pattern 
of results so far has suggested that fertility of some groups actually responded before the 
election was won. It is perhaps more plausible that the election promise seemed more credible 
to couples and families living in municipalities dominated by Social Democrats than to other 
families. In order to investigate this issue further we explore if the responses to the reform 
vary with municipal voting patterns. To this end we estimate the preferred baseline models 
separately for households living in municipalities that had above or below median share of 
social democratic voters in the 1998 election
24. Results are presented in Table 11. 
Columns 1 and 2 display results for couples without children. It is clear that couples in 
social democratic  municipalities  respond more strongly, and in particular they responded 
immediately to the election promise in 1998. Estimated coefficients suggest that c hildless 
couples in other municipalities respond later on,  the joint test show  statistical significance. 
For  families  with  children  there  appears  to  be  no  clear  difference  alon g  this  political 
dimension.  In particular, standard errors are large and  we are unable to draw any strong 
conclusions. 
 
                                                 
24 The median share of votes for the Social Democrats in the 1998-election was 38 per cent.   35 
 
Table 11 Heterogenous effects: Political Voting patterns  
Variables  ΔChild births per 1,000 women 
  Households w/o children  Households with children 






Low share soc. 
dem  
         
ΔMC_1997  -0.0935  0.0628  0.0356  -0.00564 
  (0.0874)  (0.0742)  (0.0648)  (0.0427) 
ΔMC_1998  -0.288***  0.00263  0.0419  0.0101 
  (0.102)  (0.0884)  (0.0548)  (0.0448) 
ΔMC_1999  -0.0270  -0.123  -0.0606  -0.0909* 
  (0.103)  (0.0809)  (0.0712)  (0.0485) 
ΔMC_2000  -0.194*  -0.0779  0.0651  0.0451 
  (0.107)  (0.0803)  (0.0641)  (0.0348) 
ΔMC_2001  -0.0457  -0.0276  -0.0137  -0.00246 
  (0.134)  (0.0658)  (0.0684)  (0.0279) 
ΔMC_2002  -0.0170  -0.0452  -0.0933  -0.0236 
  (0.0958)  (0.0793)  (0.0637)  (0.0305) 
ΔMC_2003  -0.0461  -0.0540  0.0654  -0.0125 
  (0.0873)  (0.0960)  (0.0767)  (0.0370) 
ΔSQ_1997      -0.0239  0.00708 
      (0.101)  (0.0493) 
ΔSQ_1998      0.0209  0.0766 
      (0.0956)  (0.0627) 
ΔSQ_1999      0.0499  0.000261 
      (0.122)  (0.0376) 
ΔSQ_2000      -0.0441  0.00851 
      (0.104)  (0.0461) 
ΔSQ_2001      0.0757  -0.0433 
      (0.116)  (0.0454) 
ΔSQ_2002      0.149  -0.00464 
      (0.122)  (0.0550) 
ΔSQ_2003      0.0469  0.00512 
      (0.0857)  (0.0486) 
         
Control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Household 
type×year FE 
No  No  Yes  Yes 



















Observations  19,052  25,541  254,382  370,275 
R-squared  0.130  0.112  0.086  0.098 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parenthesis. * indicates significance at the 10%-
level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Household types are defined by the number of children under   36 
the age of 10, the exact age of the youngest child, the age category (ages 0–3, 4–5, 6–9) of the next three 
youngest children and a household monthly income span of 1,000 SEK. Control variables are woman‘s age and 
education, and local unemployment. 
Conclusions  
We have studied the effect of reducing childcare costs on the fertility behavior of Swedish 
families. We explore the variation in costs induced by a childcare fee reform which was 
announced as an election promise of the Social Democrats in 1998 and was implemented in 
2002. The reform lowered the marginal cost of having additional children, but also implied a 
positive income shock for families that already had children enrolled in childcare.  
Our analysis of the dynamics of childbirth for the years around the reform suggests that 
married  couples  without  children  reacted  already  to  the  election  victory  of  the  Social 
Democrats  in  1998  by  having  children.  It  was  primarily  low  income  households  which 
increased fertility. The somewhat surprising early reaction suggests that the election promise 
was regarded as credible. It is plausible that the election promise seem more credible for 
households in municipalities dominated by Social Democrats. In line with this reasoning we 
find that only married couples in those municipalities reacted to the election promise. The 
reform implied a total reduction of child care costs of on average 111 000 SEK (17 000 
USD), which is about a quarter of a years‘ earnings for these households. The effect was to 
increase fertility by 9.8 per cent.  
Households with one child did not increase their total demand for children, but appear to 
have postponed second births. One explanation for this could be  that these household timed 
the second child to make sure they benefitted from the low cost for a maximal time. There is 
some evidence that families with two or more children increased fertility as a response to the 
reduction in the marginal cost. The reform induced a marginal child care cost reduction of 18 
percent of a year‘s family earnings and the estimated effect implies an increase in higher 
order births with some 14.5 percent. The total effect is however only marginally significant. 
Moreover,  because  the  present  reform  also  implied  that  families  with  children  already 
enrolled  in  childcare  experienced  a  positive  income  shock,  which  appears  to  have  had  a 
negative effect on the demand for children, it is not clear what the overall impact of the 
reform was. Effects may well cancel out.   37 
We can compare the magnitude of the estimated effect with the findings of other studies 
that  investigate  the  effect  of  other  economic  incentives  on  fertility.  Milligan  (2005) 
investigates the effects of a pro-natalist transfer policy implemented in Quebec, in which 
mothers received a cash bonus for giving birth. Using the exogenous variation created by the 
reform, he finds that there is a substantial impact of childcare allowances on fertility rates. 
Milligan finds that a cash bonus of 1,000 Canadian Dollars (USD 950) increased fertility by 
16 percent. Laroque and Salanié (2004), instead, apply a structural model of maternal labor 
supply  and  fertility  to  French  data  and  family  policies  (although  ignoring  the  effects  of 
childcare). In simulations, they find that increasing mothers‘ earnings reduces fertility but that 
increasing child support during the first three years, with what would correspond to a present 
value cash transfer of some USD 20,000, would increase fertility by a quarter. Finally, Cohen 
et al (2009) find, investigating the effects of Israeli child subsidies, that a reduction of USD 
34 in monthly subsidies for a marginal child decreases fertility by 8 percent. As in this study 
Cohen et al (2009) find a negative income effect for some households. The price effects 
found in this study for childless households are in comparison to the studies mentioned above 
somewhat smaller in magnitude.  
It  is  difficult to  assess  if the effect  on first  births  has  any long run impact  on cohort 
fertility.  The  timing  effect  on  families  with  one  child,  suggests  that  the  reform  did  not 
increase the demand for a second child. The reform effects on higher order births, however, 
suggest that reduced marginal costs may have influenced total fertility, although this effect is 
largely cancelled out by a negative income effect of the lower childcare costs for the children 
already enrolled in childcare.   38 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 Variable definitions 
Child: Dummy that takes the value 1 if the household had a child in an 12-month period 
Marginal cost: The present value of the cost of an additional child enrolled in full-time child care 
until the age of 9. 
Status quo childcare cost: The present value of the child care costs associated with having the 
family‘s existing children enrolled in full-time childcare until the age of 9. 
Age:  Age of the women in the households minus the median age (34) 
University: Dummy that takes the value 1 if the woman in the household has some university 
education 
The data is collapsed at the household-municipal level, and therefore one observation will be the 
household type  municipality  averageyear 
Unemployment: Unemployment rate at municipality level   41 
Table A.2 Birth rates per 1000 women 1997–2001 and mean characteristics in 2000 
  Childless 
households 
Households with children 
 
Variable    All  one child  at least 
two 
children 










         










         










         










         










         








































Number of household types 









Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis 
 
 